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Abstract
A k-collision for a compressing hash function H is a set of k distinct inputs that all map
to the same output. In this work, we show that for any constant k, Θ
(
N
1
2
(1− 1
2k−1
)
)
quantum
queries are both necessary and sufficient to achieve a k-collision with constant probability. This
improves on both the best prior upper bound (Hosoyamada et al., ASIACRYPT 2017) and
provides the first non-trivial lower bound, completely resolving the problem.
1 Introduction
Collision resistance is one of the central concepts in cryptography. A collision for a hash function
H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is a pair of distinct inputs x1 6= x2 that map to the same output: H(x1) =
H(x2).
Multi-collisions. Though receiving comparatively less attention in the literature, multi-collision
resistance is nonetheless an important problem. A k-collision for H is a set of k distinct inputs
{x1, . . . , xk} such that xi 6= xj for i 6= j where H(xi) = H(xj) for all i, j.
Multi-collisions frequently surface in the analysis of hash functions and other primitives. Exam-
ples include MicroMint [RS97], RMAC [JJV02], chopMD [CN08], Leamnta-LW [HIK+11], PHO-
TON and Parazoa [NO14], the Keyed-Sponge [JLM14], all of which assume the multi-collision
resistance of a certain function. Multi-collisions algorithms have also been used in attacks, such as
the MDC-2 [KMRT09], HMAC [NSWY13], Even-Mansour [DDKS14], and LED [NWW14]. Multi-
collision resistance for polynomial k has also recently emerged as a theoretical way to avoid keyed
hash functions [BKP18, BDRV18], or as a useful cryptographic primitives, for example, to build
statistically hiding commitment schemes with succinct interaction[KNY18].
Quantum. Quantum computing stands to fundamentally change the field of cryptography. Im-
portantly for our work, Grover’s algorithm [Gro96] can speed up brute force searching by a quadratic
factor, greatly increasing the speed of pre-image attacks on hash functions. In turn, Grover’s al-
gorithm can be used to find ordinary collisions (k = 2) in time O(2n/3), speeding up the classical
“birthday” attack which requires O(2n/2) time. It is also known that, in some sense (discussed
below), these speedups are optimal [AS04, Zha15a]. These attacks require updated symmetric
primitives with longer keys in order to make such attacks intractable.
1
Upper Bound (Algorithm) Lower Bound
[BHT98] O(2m/3) for k = 2 (2-to-1)
[AS04] Ω(2m/3) for k = 2 (2-to-1)
[Zha15a] O(2n/3) for k = 2 (Random, m ≥ n/2) Ω(2n/3) for k = 2 (Random)
[HSX17] O
(
2
1
2
(1− 1
3k−1 )n
)
(m ≥ n+ log k)
This Work O
(
2
1
2
(1− 1
2k−1 )n
)
(m ≥ n+ log k) Ω
(
2
1
2
(1− 1
2k−1 )n
)
(Random)
Table 1: Quantum query complexity results for k-collisions. k is taken to be a constant, and all Big
O and Ω notations hide constants that depend on k. In parenthesis are the main restrictions for
the lower bounds provided. We note that in the case of 2-to-1 functions, m ≤ n + 1, so implicitly
these bounds only apply in this regime. In these cases, m characterizes the query complexity. On
the other hand, for random or arbitrary functions, n is the more appropriate way to measure query
complexity. We also note that for arbitrary functions, when m ≤ n+ log(k − 1), it is possible that
H contains no k-collisions, so the problem becomes impossible. Hence, m ≥ n+ log k is essentially
tight. For random functions, there will be no collisions w.h.p unless m & (1 − 1k )n, so algorithms
on random functions must always operate in this regime.
1.1 This Work: Quantum Query Complexity of Multi-collision Resistance
In this work, we consider quantum multi-collision resistance. Unfortunately, little is known of the
difficulty of finding multi -collisions for k ≥ 3 in the quantum setting. The only prior work on this
topic is that of Hosoyamada et al. [HSX17], who give a O(24n/9) algorithm for 3-collisions, as well
as algorithms for general constant k. On the lower bounds side, the Ω(2n/3) from the k = 2 case
applies as well for higher k, and this is all that is known.
We completely resolve this question, giving tight upper and lower bounds for any constant k. In
particular, we consider the quantum query complexity of multi-collisions. We will model the hash
function H as a random oracle. This means, rather than getting concrete code for a hash function
H, the adversary is given black box access to a function H chosen uniformly at random from the
set of all functions from {0, 1}m into {0, 1}n. Since we are in the quantum setting, black box access
means the adversary can make quantum queries to H. Each query will cost the adversary 1 time
step. The adversary’s goal is to solve some problem — in our case find a k-collision — with the
minimal cost. Our results are summarized in Table 1. Both our upper bounds and lower bounds
improve upon the prior work for k ≥ 3; for example, for k = 3, we show that the quantum query
complexity is Θ(23n/7).
1.2 Motivation
Typically, the parameters of a hash function are set to make finding collisions intractable. One
particularly important parameter is the output length of the hash function, since the output length
in turn affects storage requirements and the efficiency of other parts of a cryptographic protocol.
Certain attacks, called generic attacks, apply regardless of the implementation details of the
hash function H, and simply work by evaluating H on several inputs. For example, the birthday
attack shows that it is possible to find a collision in time approximately 2n/2 by a classical computer.
Generalizations show that k-collisions can be found in time Θ(2(1−1/k)n) 1.
1Here, the Big Theta notation hides a constant that depends on k
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These are also known to be optimal among classical generic attacks. This is demonstrated
by modeling H as an oracle, and counting the number of queries needed to find (k-)collisions in
an arbitrary hash function H. In cryptographic settings, it is common to model H as a random
function, giving stronger average case lower bounds.
Understanding the effect of generic attacks is critical. First, they cannot be avoided, since they
apply no matter how H is designed. Second, other parameters of the function, such as the number
of iterations of an internal round function, can often be tuned so that the best known attacks are
in fact generic. Therefore, for many hash functions, the complexity of generic attacks accurately
represents the actual cost of breaking them.
Therefore, for “good” hash functions where generic attacks are optimal, in order to achieve
security against classical adversaries n must be chosen so that t = 2n/2 time steps are intractable.
This often means setting t = 2128, so n = 256. In contrast, generic classical attacks can find
k-collisions in time Θ(2(1−1/k)n). For example, this means that n must be set to 192 to avoid
3-collisions, or 171 to avoid 4-collisions.
Once quantum computers enter the picture, we need to consider quantum queries to H in order
to model actual attacks that evaluate H in superposition. This changes the query complexity, and
makes proving bounds much more difficult. Just as understanding query complexity in the classical
setting was crucial to guide parameter choices, it will be critical in the quantum world as well.
We also believe that quantum query complexity is an important study in its own right, as it
helps illuminate the effects quantum computing will have on various areas of computer science.
It is especially important to cryptography, as many of the questions have direct implications to
the post-quantum security of cryptosystems. Even more, the techniques involved are often closely
related to proof techniques in post-quantum cryptography. For example, bounds for the quantum
query complexity of finding collisions in random functions [Zha15a], as well as more general func-
tions [EU17, BES17], were developed from techniques for proving security in the quantum random
oracle model [BDF+11, Zha12, TU16]. Similarly, the lower bounds in this work build on tech-
niques for proving quantum indifferentiability [Zha18]. On the other hand, proving the security of
MACs against superposition queries [BZ13] resulted in new lower bounds for the quantum oracle
interrogation problem [van98] and generalizations [Zha15b].
Lastly, multi-collision finding can be seen as a variant of k-distinctness, which is essentially
the problem of finding a k-collision in a function H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, where the k-collision
may be unique and all other points are distinct. The quantum query complexity of k-distinctness
is currently one of the main open problems in quantum query complexity. An upper bound of
(2n)
3
4
− 1
4(2k−1) was shown by Belovs [Bel12]. The best known lower bound is Ω((2n)
3
4
− 1
2k ) [BKT18].
Interestingly, the dependence of the exponent on k is exponential for the upper bound, but poly-
nomial for the lower bound, suggesting a fundamental gap our understanding of the problem.
Note that our results do not immediately apply in this setting, as our algorithm operates only in
a regime where there are many (≤ k-)collisions, whereas k-distinctness applies even if the k-collision
is unique and all other points are distinct (in particular, no (k− 1)-collisions). On the other hand,
our lower bound is always lower than 2n/2, which is trivial for this problem. Nonetheless, both
problems are searching for the same thing — namely a k-collisions — just in different settings. We
hope that future work may be able to extend our techniques to solve the problem of k-distinctness.
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1.3 The Reciprocal Plus 1 Rule
For many search problems over random functions, such as pre-image search, collision finding, k-
sum, quantum oracle interrogation, and more, a very simple folklore rule of thumb translates the
classical query complexity into quantum query complexity.
In particular, let N = 2n, all of these problems have a classical query complexity Θ(N1/α) for
some rational number α. Curiously, the quantum query complexity of all these problems is always
Θ(N
1
α+1 ).
In slightly more detail, for all of these problems the best classical q-query algorithm solves the
problem with probability Θ(qc/Nd) for some constants c, d. Then the classical query complexity is
Θ(Nd/c). For this class of problems, the success probability of the best q query quantum algorithm
is obtained simply by increasing the power of q by d. This results in a quantum query complexity
of Θ(Nd/(c+d)). Examples:
• Grover’s pre-image search [Gro96] improves success probability from q/N to q2/N , which
is known to be optimal [BBBV97]. The result is a query complexity improvement from
N = N1/1 to N1/2.
Similarly, finding, say, 2 pre-images has classical success probability q2/N2; it is straight-
forward to adapt known techniques to prove that the best quantum success probability is
q4/N2. Again, the query complexity goes from N to N1/2. Analogous statements hold for
any constant number of pre-images.
• The BHT collision finding algorithm [BHT98] finds a collision with probability q3/N , im-
proving on the classical birthday attack q2/N . Both of these are known to be optimal [AS04,
Zha15a]. Thus quantum algorithms improve the query complexity from N1/2 to N1/3.
Similarly, finding, say, 2 distinct collisions has classical success probability q4/N2, whereas we
show that the quantum success probability is q6/N2. More generally, any constant number
of distinct collisions conforms to the Reciprocal Plus 1 Rule.
• k-sum asks to find a set of k inputs such that the sum of the outputs is 0. This is a different
generalization of collision finding than what we study in this work. Classically, the best
algorithm succeeds with probability qk/N . Quantumly, the best algorithm succeeds with
probability qk+1/N [BS13, Zha18]. Hence the query complexity goes from N1/k to N1/(k+1).
Again, solving for any constant number of distinct k-sum solutions also conforms to the
Reciprocal Plus 1 Rule.
• In the oracle interrogation problem, the goal is to compute q + 1 input/output pairs, using
only q queries. Classically, the best success probability is clearly 1/N . Meanwhile, Boneh
and Zhandry [BZ13] give a quantum algorithm with success probability roughly q/N , which
is optimal.
Some readers may have noticed that Reciprocal Plus 1 (RP1) rule does not immediately appear
to apply the Element Distinctness. The Element Distinctness problem asks to find a collision
in H : [M ] → [N ] where the collision is unique. Classically, the best algorithm succeeds with
probability Θ(q2/M2). On the other hand, quantum algorithms can succeed with probability
Θ(q3/M2), which is optimal [Amb04, Zha15a]. This does not seem to follow the prediction of the
RP1 rule, which would have predicted q4/M2. However, we note that unlike the settings above
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which make sense when N ≪ M , and where the complexity is characterized by N , the Element
Distinctness problem requires M ≤ N and the complexity is really characterized by the domain
size M . Interestingly, we note that for a random expanding function, when N ≈ M2, there will
with constant probability be exactly one collision in H. Thus, in this regime the collision problem
matches the Element Distinctness problem, and the RP1 rule gives the right query complexity!
Similarly, the quantum complexity for k-sum is usually written as Mk/(k+1), not N1/(k+1). But
again, this is because most of the literature considers H for which there is a unique k-sum and H
is non-compressing, in which case the complexity is better measured in terms of M . Notice that a
random function will contain a unique k collision when N ≈Mk, in which case the bound we state
(which follows the RP1 rule) exactly matches the statement usually given.
On the other hand, the RP1 rule does not give the right answer for k-distinctness for k ≥ 3,
since the RP1 rule would predict the exponent to approach 1/2 for large k, whereas prior work
shows that it approaches 3/4 for large k. That RP1 does not apply perhaps makes sense, since
there is no setting of N,M where a random function will become an instance of k-distinctness: for
any setting of parameters where a random function has a k-collision, it will also most likely have
many (k − 1)-collisions.
The takeaway is that the RP1 Rule seems to apply for natural search problems that make sense
on random functions when N ≪ M . Even for problems that do not immediately fit this setting
such as Element Distinctness, the rule often still gives the right query complexity by choosingM,N
so that a random function is likely to give an instance of the desired problem.
Enter k-collisions. In the case of k-collisions, the classical best success probability is qk/N (k−1),
giving a query complexity of N (k−1)/k = N1−1/k. Since the k-collision problem is a generalization
of collision finding, is similar in spirit to the problems above, and applies to compressing random
functions, one may expect that the Reciprocal Plus 1 Rule applies. If true, this would give a
quantum success probability of q2k−1/Nk−1, and a query complexity of N (k−1)/(2k−1) = N
1
2
(1− 1
2k−1 ).
Even more, for small enough q, it is straightforward to find a k-collision with probability
O(q2k−1/Nk−1) as desired. In particular, divide the q queries into k − 1 blocks. Using the first
q/(k−1) queries, find a 2-collision with probability (q/(k−1))3/N = O(q3/N). Let y be the image
of the collision. Then, for each of the remaining (k − 2) blocks of queries, find a pre-image of y
with probability (q/(k − 1))2/N = O(q2/N) using Grover search. The result is k colliding inputs
with probability O(q3+2(k−2)/Nk−1) = O(q2k−1/Nk−1). It is also possible to prove that this is a
lower bound on the success probability (see lower bound discussion below). Now, this algorithm
works as long q ≤ N1/3, since beyond this range the 2-collision success probability is bounded by
1 < q3/N . Nonetheless, it is asymptotically tight in the regime for which it applies. This seems to
suggest that the limitation to small q might be an artifact of the algorithm, and that a more clever
algorithm could operate beyond the N1/3 barrier. In particular, this strongly suggests k-collisions
conforms to the Reciprocal Plus 1 Rule.
Note that the RP1 prediction gives an exponent that depends polynomially on k, asymptotically
approaching 1/2. In contrast, the prior work of [HSX17] approaches 1/2 exponentially fast in k.
Thus, prior to our work we see an exponential vs polynomial gap for k-collisions, similar to the
case of k-distinctness.
Perhaps surprisingly given the above discussion2, our work demonstrates that the right answer
2At least, the authors found it surprising!
5
is in fact exponential, refuting the RP1 rule for k-collisions.
As mentioned above, our results do not immediately give any indication for the query complexity
of k-distinctness. However, our results may hint that k-distinctness also exhibits an exponential
dependence on k. We hope that future work, perhaps building on our techniques, will be able to
resolve this question.
1.4 Technical Details
1.4.1 The Algorithm
At their heart, the algorithms for pre-image search, collision finding, k-sum, and the recent algo-
rithm for k-collision, all rely on Grover’s algorithm. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a function with a
fraction δ of accepting inputs. Grover’s algorithm finds the input with probability O(δq2) using q
quantum queries to f . Grover’s algorithm finds a pre-image of a point y in H by setting f(x) to
be 1 if and only if H(x) = y.
The BHT algorithm [BHT98] uses Grover’s to find a collision in H. First, it queries H on
q/2 = O(q) random points, assembling a database D. As long as q ≪ N1/2, all the images in D will
be distinct. Now, it lets f(x) be the function that equals 1 if and only if H(x) is found amongst
the images in D, and x is not among the pre-images. By finding an accepting input to f , one
immediately finds a collision. Notice that the fraction of accepting inputs is approximately q/N .
By running Grover’s for q/2 = O(q) steps, one obtains a such a pre-image, and hence a collision,
with probability O((q/N)q2) = O(q3/N).
Hosoyamada et al. show how this idea can be recursively applied to find multi-collisions. For
k = 3, the first step is to find a database D2 consisting of r distinct 2-collisions. By recursively
applying the BHT algorithm, each 2-collision takes time N1/3. Then, to find a 3 collision, set up
f as before: f(x) = 1 if and only if H(x) is amongst the images in D and x is not among the
pre-images. The fraction of accepting inputs is approximately r/N , so Grover’s algorithm will find
a 3-collision in time (N/r)1/2. Setting r to be N1/9 optimizes the total query count as N4/9. For
k = 4, recursively build a table D3 of 3-collisions, and set up f to find a collision with the database.
The result is an algorithm for k-collisions for any constant k, using O(N
1
2
(1− 1
3k−1 )) queries.
Our algorithm improves on Hosoyamada et al.’s, yielding a query complexity of O(N
1
2
(1− 1
2k−1 )).
Note that for Hosoyamada et al.’s algorithm, when constructingDk−1, many differentDk−2 databases
are being constructed, one for each entry in Dk−1. Our key observation is that a single database
can be re-used for the different entries of Dk−1. This allows us to save on some of the queries
being made. These extra queries can then be used in other parts of the algorithm to speed up the
computation. By balancing the effort correctly, we obtain our algorithm. Put another way, the cost
of finding many (k-)collisions can be amortized over many instances, and then recursively used for
finding collisions with higher k. Since the recursive steps involve solving many instances, this leads
to an improved computational cost.
In more detail, we iteratively construct databases D1,D2, . . . ,Dk. Each Di will have ri i-
collisions. We set rk = 1, indicating that we only need a single k-collision. To construct database
D1, simply query on r1 arbitrary points. To construct database Di, i ≥ 2, define the function fi
that accepts inputs that collide with Di−1 but are not contained in Di−1. The fraction of points
accepted by fi is approximately ri−1/N . Therefore, Grover’s algorithm returns an accepting input
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in time (N/ri−1)1/2. We simply run Grover’s algorithm ri times using the same database Di−1 to
construct Di in time ri(N/ri−1)1/2.
Now we just optimize r1, . . . , rk−1 by setting the number of queries to construct each database
to be identical. Notice that r1 = O(q), so solving for ri gives us
rk = O
(
q
2− 1
2k−1
N
1− 1
2k−1
)
Setting rk = 1 and solving for q gives the desired result. In particular, in the case k = 3, our
algorithm finds a collision in time O(N3/7).
1.4.2 The Lower Bound.
Notice that our algorithm fails to match the result one would get by applying the “Reciprocal Plus
1 Rule”. Given the discussion above, one may expect that our iterative algorithm could potentially
be improved on even more. To the contrary we prove that, in fact, our algorithm is asymptotically
optimal for any constant k.
Toward that end, we employ a recent technique developed by Zhandry [Zha18] for analyzing
quantum queries to random functions. We use this technique to show that our algorithm is tight
for random functions, giving an average-case lower bound.
Zhandry’s “Compressed Oracles.” Zhandry demonstrates that the information an adversary
knows about a random oracle H can be summarized by a database D∗ of input/output pairs,
which is updated according to special rules. In Zhandry’s terminology, D∗ is the “compressed
standard/phase oracle”.
This D∗ is not a classical database, but technically a superposition of databases, meaning
certain amplitudes are assigned to each possible database. D∗ can be measured, obtaining an actual
classical database D with probability equal to its amplitude squared. In the following discussion,
we will sometimes pretend that D∗ is actually a classical database. While inaccurate, this will give
the intuition for the lower bound techniques we employ. In the section 4 we take care to correctly
analyze D∗ as a superposition of databases.
Zhandry shows roughly the following:
• Consider any “pre-image problem”, whose goal is to find a set of pre-images such that the
images satisfy some property. For example, k-collision is the problem of finding k pre-images
such that the corresponding images are all the same.
Then after q queries, consider measuring D∗. The adversary can only solve the pre-image
problem after q queries if the measured D∗ has a solution to the pre-image problem.
Thus, we can always upper bound the adversary’s success probability by upper bounding the
probability D∗ contains a solution.
• D∗ starts off empty, and each query can only add one point to the database.
• For any image point y, consider the amplitude on databases containing y as a function of q
(remember that amplitude is the square root of the probability). Zhandry shows that this
amplitude can only increase by O(
√
1/N ) from one query to the next. More generally, for a
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set S of r different images, the amplitude on databases containing any point in S can only
increase by O(
√|S|/N ).
The two results above immediately imply the optimality of Grover’s search. In particular, the
amplitude on databases containing y is at most O(q
√
1/N ) after q queries, so the probability of
obtaining a solution is the square of this amplitude, or O(q2/N). This also readily gives a lower
bound for the collision problem. Namely, in order to introduce a collision to D∗, the adversary
must add a point that collides with one of the existing points in D∗. Since there are at most q
such points, the amplitude on such D∗ can only increase by O(
√
q/N). This means the overall
amplitude after q queries is at most O(q3/2/N1/2). Squaring to get a probability gives the correct
lower bound.
A First Attempt. Our core idea is to attempt a lower bound for k-collision by applying these
ideas recursively. The idea is that, in order to add, say, a 3-collision to D∗, there must be an
existing 2-collision in the database. We can then use the 2-collision lower bound to bound the
increase in amplitude that results from each query.
More precisely, for very small q, we can bound the amplitude on databases containing ℓ distinct
2-collisions as O( (q3/2/N1/2)ℓ). If q ≪ N1/3, ℓ must be a constant else this term is negligible. So
we can assume for q < N1/3 that ℓ is a constant.
Then, we note that in order to introduce a 3-collision, the adversary’s new point must collide
with one of the existing 2-collisions. Since there are at most ℓ, we know that the amplitude increases
by at most O(
√
ℓ/N1/2) = O(1/N1/2) since ℓ is a constant. This shows that the amplitude on
databases with 3-collisions is at most q/N1/2.
We can bound the amplitude increase even smaller by using not only the fact that the database
contains at most ℓ 2-collisions, but the fact that the amplitude on databases containing even a
single 2-collision is much less than 1. In particular, it is O(q3/2/N1/2) as demonstrated above.
Intuitively, it turns out we can actually just multiply the 1/N1/2 amplitude increase in the case
where the database contains a 2-collision by the q3/2/N1/2 amplitude on databases containing any
2-collision to get an overall amplitude increase of q3/2/N .
Overall then, we upper bound the amplitude after q < N1/3 queries by O(q5/2/N), given an
upper bound of O(q5/N2) on the probability of finding a 3-collision. This lower bound can be
extended recursively to any constant k-collisions, resulting in a bound that exactly matches the
Reciprocal Plus 1 Rule, as well as the algorithm for small q! This again seems to suggest that our
algorithm is not optimal.
Our Full Proof. There are two problems with the argument above that, when resolved, actually
do show our algorithm is optimal. First, when q ≥ N1/3, the O(q3/2/N1/2) part of the amplitude
bound becomes vacuous, as amplitudes can never be more than 1. Second, the argument fails to
consider algorithms that find many 2-collisions, which is possible when q > N1/3. Finding many
2-collisions of course takes more queries, but then it makes extending to 3-collisions easier, as there
are more collisions in the database to match in each iteration.
In our full proof, we examine the amplitude on the databases containing a 3-collision as well as
r 2-collisions, after q queries. We call this amplitude gq,r. We show a careful recursive formula for
bounding g using Zhandry’s techniques, which we then solve.
More generally, for any constant k, we let g
(k)
q,r,s be the amplitude on databases containing
exactly r distinct (k − 1)-collisions and at least s distinct k-collisions after q queries. We develop
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a multiply-recursive formula for the g(k) in terms of the g(k) and g(k−1). We then recursively plug
in our solution to g(k−1) so that the recursion is just in terms of g(k), which we then solve using
delicate arguments.
Interestingly, this recursive structure for our lower bound actually closely matches our algorithm.
Namely, our proof lower bounds the difficulty of adding an i-collision to a database D∗ containing
many i− 1 collisions, exactly the problem our algorithm needs to solve. Our techniques essentially
show that every step of our algorithm is tight, resulting in a lower bound of Ω
(
N
1
2
(1− 1
2k−1 )
)
,
exactly matching our algorithm. Thus, we solve the quantum query complexity of k-collisions.
1.5 Other Related Work
Most of the related work has been mentioned earlier. Recently, in [HSTX18], Hosoyamada, Sasaki,
Tani and Xagawa gave the same improvement. And they also showed that, their algorithm can also
find a multi-collision for a more general setting where |X| ≥ lcN · |Y | for any positive value cN ≥ 1
which is in o(N
1
2l−1 ) and find a multiclaw for random functions with the same query complexity.
They also noted that our improved collision finding algorithm for the case |X| ≥ l · |Y | was reported
in the Rump Session of AsiaCrypt 2017. They did not give an accompanying lower bound.
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2 Preliminaries
Here, we recall some basic facts about quantum computation, and review the relevant literature on
quantum search problems.
2.1 Quantum Computation
A quantum system Q is defined over a finite set B of classical states. In this work we will consider
B = {0, 1}n. A pure state over Q is a unit vector in C|B|, which assigns a complex number to
each element in B. In other words, let |φ〉 be a pure state in Q, we can write |φ〉 as:
|φ〉 =
∑
x∈B
αx|x〉
where
∑
x∈B |αx|2 = 1 and {|x〉}x∈B is called the “computational basis” of C|B|. The computa-
tional basis forms an orthonormal basis of C|B|.
Given two quantum systems Q1 over B1 and Q2 over B2, we can define a product quantum
system Q1 ⊗Q2 over the set B1 × B2. Given |φ1〉 ∈ Q1 and |φ2〉 ∈ Q2, we can define the product
state |φ1〉 ⊗ |φ2〉 ∈ Q1 ⊗Q2.
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We say |φ〉 ∈ Q1 ⊗Q2 is entangled if there does not exist |φ1〉 ∈ Q1 and |φ2〉 ∈ Q2 such that
|φ〉 = |φ1〉 ⊗ |φ2〉. For example, consider B1 = B2 = {0, 1} and Q1 = Q2 = C2, |φ〉 = |00〉+|11〉√2 is
entangled. Otherwise, we say |φ〉 is un-entangled.
A pure state |φ〉 ∈ Q can be manipulated by a unitary transformation U . The resulting state
|φ′〉 = U |φ〉.
We can extract information from a state |φ〉 by performing a measurement. A measurement
specifies an orthonormal basis, typically the computational basis, and the probability of getting
result x is |〈x|φ〉|2. After the measurement, |φ〉 “collapses” to the state |x〉 if the result is x.
For example, given the pure state |φ〉 = 35 |0〉+ 45 |1〉 measured under {|0〉, |1〉}, with probability
9/25 the result is 0 and |φ〉 collapses to |0〉; with probability 16/25 the result is 1 and |φ〉 collapses
to |1〉.
We finally assume a quantum computer can implement any unitary transformation (by using
these basic gates, Hadamard, phase, CNOT and π8 gates), especially the following two unitary
transformations:
• Classical Computation: Given a function f : X → Y , one can implement a unitary Uf
over C|X|·|Y | → C|X|·|Y | such that for any |φ〉 =∑x∈X,y∈Y αx,y|x, y〉,
Uf |φ〉 =
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
αx,y|x, y ⊕ f(x)〉
Here, ⊕ is a commutative group operation defined over Y .
• Quantum Fourier Transform: Let N = 2n. Given a quantum state |φ〉 = ∑2n−1i=0 xi|i〉,
by applying only O(n2) basic gates, one can compute |ψ〉 = ∑2n−1i=0 yi|i〉 where the sequence
{yi}2n−1i=0 is the sequence achieved by applying the classical Fourier transform QFTN to the
sequence {xi}2n−1i=0 :
yk =
1√
N
2n−1∑
i=0
xiω
ik
n
where ωn = e
2πi/N , i is the imaginary unit.
One interesting property of QFT is that by preparing |0n〉 and applying QFT2 to each qubit,
(QFT2|0〉)⊗n = 1√2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n |x〉 which is a uniform superposition over all possible x ∈
{0, 1}n.
For convenience, we sometimes ignore the normalization of a pure state which can be calculated
from the context.
2.2 Grover’s algorithm and BHT algorithm
Definition 1 (Database Search Problem). Suppose there is a function/database encoded as F :
X → {0, 1} and F−1(1) is non-empty. The problem is to find x∗ ∈ X such that F (x∗) = 1.
We will consider adversaries with quantum access to F , meaning they submit queries as∑
x∈X,y∈{0,1} αx,y|x, y〉 and receive in return
∑
x∈X,y∈{0,1} αx,y|x, y⊕F (x)〉. Grover’s algorithm [Gro96]
finds a pre-image using an optimal number of queries:
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Theorem 2 ([Gro96, BBHT98]). Let F be a function F : X → {0, 1}. Let t = |F−1(1)| > 0 be the
number of pre-images of 1. There is a quantum algorithm that finds x∗ ∈ X such that F (x∗) = 1
with an expected number of quantum queries to F at most O
(√
|X|
t
)
even without knowing t in
advance.
We will normally think of the number of queries as being fixed, and consider the probability of
success given the number of queries. The algorithm from Theorem 2, when runs for q queries, can
be shown to have a success probability min(1, O(q2/(|X|/t))). For the rest of the paper, “Grover’s
algorithm” will refer to this algorithm.
Now let us look at another important problem: 2-collision finding problem on 2-to-1 functions.
Definition 3 (Collision Finding on 2-to-1 Functions). Assume |X| = 2|Y | = 2N . Consider a
function F : X → Y such that for every y ∈ Y , |F−1(y)| = 2. In other words, every image has
exactly two pre-images. The problem is to find x 6= x′ such that F (x) = F (x′).
Brassard, Høyer and Tapp proposed a quantum algorithm [BHT98] that solved the problem
using only O(N1/3) quantum queries. The idea is the following:
• Prepare a list of input and output pairs, L = {(xi, yi = F (xi)}ti=1 where xi is drawn uniformly
at random and t = N1/3;
• If there is a 2-collision in L, output that pair. Otherwise,
• Run Grover’s algorithm on the following function F ′: F ′(x) = 1 if and only if there exists
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}, F (x) = yi = F (xi) and x 6= xi. Output the solution x, as well as whatever
xi it collides with.
This algorithm takes O(t+
√
N/t) quantum queries and when t = Θ(N1/3), the algorithm finds a
2-collision with O(N1/3) quantum queries.
2.3 Multi-collision Finding and [HSX17]
Hosoyamada, Sasaki and Xagawa proposed an algorithm for k-collision finding on any function
F : X → Y where |X| ≥ k|Y | (k is a constant). They generalized the idea of [BHT98] and gave
the proof for even arbitrary functions. We now briefly talk about their idea. For simplicity in this
discussion, we assume F is a k-to-1 function.
The algorithm prepares t pairs of 2-collisions (x1, x
′
1), · · · , (xt, x′t) by running the BHT algorithm
t times. If two pairs of 2-collisions collide, there is at least a 3-collision (possibly a 4-collision).
Otherwise, it uses Grover’s algorithm to find a x′′ 6= xi, x′′ 6= x′i and f(x′′) = f(xi) = f(x′i). The
number of queries is O(tN1/3 +
√
N/t). When t = Θ(N1/9), the query complexity is O(N4/9).
By induction, finding a (k − 1)-collision requires O(N (3k−1−1)/(2·3k−1)) quantum queries. By
preparing t (k− 1)-collisions and applying Grover’s algorithm to it, it takes O(tN (3k−1−1)/(2·3k−1)+√
N
t ) quantum queries to get one k-collision. It turns out that t = Θ(N
1/3k) and the complexity
of finding k-collision is O(N (3
k−1)/(2·3k)).
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2.4 Compressed Fourier Oracles and Compressed Phase Oracles
In [Zha18], Zhandry showed a new technique for analyzing cryptosystems in the random oracle
model. He also showed that his technique can be used to re-prove several known quantum query
lower bounds. In this work, we will extend his technique in order to prove a new optimal lower
bound for multi-collisions.
The basic idea of Zhandry’s technique is the following: assume A is making a query to a
random oracle H and the query is
∑
x,u,z ax,u,z|x, u, z〉 where x is the query register, u is the
response register and z is its private register. Instead of only considering the adversary’s state∑
x,u,z ax,u,z|x, u+H(x), z〉 for a random oracle H, we can actually treat the whole system as∑
x,u,z
∑
H
ax,u,z|x, u+H(x), z〉 ⊗ |H〉
where |H〉 is the truth table of H. By looking at random oracles that way, Zhandry showed that
these five random oracle models/simulators are equivalent:
1. Standard Oracles:
StO
∑
x,u,z
ax,u,z|x, u, z〉 ⊗
∑
H
|H〉 ⇒
∑
x,u,z
∑
H
ax,u,z|x, u+H(x), z〉 ⊗ |H〉
2. Phase Oracles:
PhO
∑
x,u,z
ax,u,z|x, u, z〉 ⊗
∑
H
|H〉 ⇒
∑
x,u,z
ax,u,z|x, u, z〉 ⊗
∑
H
ωH(x)·un |H〉
where ωn = e
2πi/N and PhO = (I ⊗ QFT† ⊗ I) · StO · (I ⊗ QFT⊗ I). In other words, it first
applies the QFT to the u register, applies the standard query, and then applies QFT† one
more time.
3. Fourier Oracles: We can view
∑
H |H〉 as QFT|0N 〉. In other words, if we perform Fourier
transform on a function that always outputs 0, we will get a uniform superposition over all
the possible functions
∑
H |H〉.
Moreover,
∑
H ω
H(x)·u|H〉 is equivalent to QFT|0N ⊕ (x, u)〉. Here ⊕ means updating (xor)
the x-th entry in the database with u.
So in this model, we start with
∑
x,u,z a
0
x,u,z|x, u, z〉⊗QFT|D0〉 whereD0 is an all-zero function.
By making the i-th query, we have
PhO
∑
x,u,z,D
ai−1x,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗QFT|D〉 ⇒
∑
x,u,z,D
ai−1x,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗ QFT|D ⊕ (x, u)〉
The Fourier oracle incorporates QFT and operates directly on the D registers:
FourierO
∑
x,u,z,D
ai−1x,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⇒
∑
x,u,z,D
ai−1x,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗ |D ⊕ (x, u)〉
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4. Compressed Fourier Oracles: The idea is basically the same as Fourier oracles. But when
the algorithm only makes q queries, the database D with non-zero weight contains at most q
non-zero entries.
So to describe D , we only need at most q different (xi, ui) pairs (ui 6= 0) which says the
database outputs ui on xi and 0 everywhere else. And D ⊕ (x, u) is doing the following: 1)
if x is not in the list D and u 6= 0, put (x, u) in D; 2) if (x, u′) is in the list D and u′ 6= u,
update u′ to u′ ⊕ u in D; 3) if (x, u′) is in the list and u′ = u, remove (x, u′) from D.
In the model, we start with
∑
x,u,z a
0
x,u,z|x, u, z〉 ⊗ |D0〉 where D0 is an empty list. After
making the i-th query, we have
CFourierO
∑
x,u,z,D
ai−1x,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗ |D〉 ⇒
∑
x,u,z,D
ai−1x,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗ |D ⊕ (x, u)〉
5. Compressed Standard/Phase Oracles: These two models are essentially equivalent up to
an application of QFT applied to the query response register. From now on we only consider
compressed phase oracles.
By applying QFT on the u entries of the database registers of a compressed Fourier oracle,
we get a compressed phase oracle.
In this model, D contains all the pair (xi, ui) which means the oracle outputs ui on xi and
uniformly at random on other inputs. When making a query on |x, u, z,D〉,
• if (x, u′) is in the database D for some u′, a phase ωuu′n will be added to the state;
it corresponds to update w to w + u in the compressed Fourier oracle model where
w = D(x) in the compressed Fourier database.
• otherwise a superposition is appended to the state |x〉 ⊗∑u′ ωuu′n |u′〉; it corresponds to
put a new pair (x, u) in the list of the compressed Fourier oracle model;
• also make sure that the list will never have an (x, 0) pair in the compressed Fourier
oracle model (in other words, it is |x〉 ⊗∑y |y〉 in the compressed phase oracle model);
if there is one, delete that pair;
• All the ‘append’ and ‘delete’ operations above mean applying QFT.
3 Algorithm for Multi-collision Finding
In this section, we give an improved algorithm for k-collision finding. We use the same idea
from [HSX17] but carefully reorganize the algorithm to reduce the number of queries.
As a warm-up, let us consider the case k = 3 and the case where F : X → Y is a 3-to-1 function,
|X| = 3|Y | = 3N . They gives an algorithm with O(N4/9) quantum queries. Here is our algorithm
with only O(N3/7) quantum queries:
• Prepare a list L = {(xi, yi = F (xi))}t1i=1 where xi are distinct and t1 = N3/7. This requires
O(N3/7) classical queries on random points.
• Define the following function F ′ on X:
F ′(x) =
{
1, x 6∈ {x1, x2, · · · , xt1} and F (x) = yj for some j
0, otherwise
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Run Grover’s algorithm on function F ′. Wlog (by reordering L), we find x′1 such that x
′
1 6= x1
and F (x′1) = F (x1) using O(
√
N/N3/7) = O(N2/7) quantum queries.
• Repeat the last step t2 = N1/7 times, we will have N1/7 2-collisions L′ = {(xi, x′i, yi)}t2i=1.
This takes O(N1/7 ·
√
N/N3/7) = O(N3/7) quantum queries.
• If two elements in L′ collide, simply output a 3-collision. Otherwise, run Grover’s on function
G:
G(x) =
{
1, x 6∈ {x1, x2, · · · , xt2 , x′1, · · · , x′t2} and F (x) = yj for some j
0, otherwise
A 3-collision will be found when Grover’s algorithm finds a pre-image of 1 on G. It takes
O(
√
N/N1/7) = O(N3/7) quantum queries.
Overall, the algorithm finds a 3-collision using O(N3/7) quantum queries.
The similar algorithm and analysis works for any constant k and any k-to-1 function which only
requires O(N (2
k−1−1)/(2k−1)) quantum queries. Let t1 = N (2
k−1−1)/(2k−1), t2 = N (2
k−2−1)/(2k−1), · · · ,
ti = N
(2k−i−1)/(2k−1), · · · , tk−1 = N1/(2k−1). The algorithm works as follows:
• Assume F : X → Y is a k-to-1 function and |X| = k|Y | = kN .
• Prepare a list L1 of input-output pairs of size t1. With overwhelming probability (1−N−1/2k),
L1 does not contain a collision. By letting t0 = N , this step makes t1
√
N/t0 quantum queries.
• Define a function F2(x) that returns 1 if the input x is not in L1 but the image F (x) collides
with one of the images in L1, otherwise it returns 0. Run Grover’s on F2 t2 times. Every
time Grover’s algorithm outputs x′, it gives a 2-collision. With probability 1 − O(N−1/2k )
(explained below), all these t2 collisions do not collide. So we have a list L2 of t2 different
2-collisions. This step makes t2
√
N/t1 quantum queries.
• For 2 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, define a function Fi(x) that returns 1 if the input x is not in Li−1 but the
image F (x) collides with one of the images of (i − 1)-collisions in Li−1, otherwise it returns
0. Run Grover’s algorithm on Fi ti times. Every time Grover’s algorithm outputs x
′, it gives
an i-collision. With probability 1−O(t2i /ti−1) = 1−O(N−1/2
k
), all these ti collisions do not
collide. So we have a list Li of ti different i-collisions. This step makes ti
√
N/ti−1 quantum
queries.
• Finally given tk−1 (k−1)-collisions, using Grover’s to find a single x′ that makes a k-collision
with one of the (k − 1)-collision in Lk−1. This step makes tk
√
N/tk−1 quantum queries by
letting tk = 1 = N
(2k−k−1)/(2k−1).
The number of quantum queries made by the algorithm is simply:
k−1∑
i=0
ti+1
√
N/ti =
k−1∑
i=0
√
N
t2i+1
ti
=
k−1∑
i=0
√
N ·N
2·(2k−(i+1)−1)−(2k−i−1)
2k−1
= k ·N (2k−1−1)/(2k−1)
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So we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4. For any constant k, any k-to-1 function F : X → Y (|X| = k|Y | = kN), the
algorithm above finds a k-collision using O(N (2
k−1−1)/(2k−1)) quantum queries.
We now show the above conclusion holds for an arbitrary function F : X → Y as long as
|X| ≥ k|Y | = kN . To prove this, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let F : X → Y be a function and |X| = k|Y | = kN . Let µF = Prx
[|F−1(F (x))| ≥ k]
be the probability that if we choose x uniformly at random and y = F (x), the number of pre-images
of y is at least k. We have µF ≥ 1k .
Proof. We say an input or a collision is good if its image has at least k pre-images.
To make the probability as small as possible, we want that if y has less than k pre-images, y
should have exactly k − 1 pre-images. So the probability is at least
µF =
|{x |x is good }|
|X| ≥
kN − (k − 1)N
kN
=
1
k
Theorem 6. Let F : X → Y be a function and |X| ≥ k|Y | = kN . The above algorithm finds a
k-collision using O(N (2
k−1−1)/(2k−1)) quantum queries with overwhelming probability.
Proof. We prove the case |X| = k|Y |. The case |X| > k|Y | follows readily by choosing an arbitrary
subset X ′ ⊆ X such that |X ′| = k|Y | and restrict the algorithm to the domain X ′.
As what we did in the previous algorithm, in the list L1, with overwhelming probability, there
are 0.999µF · t1 good inputs by Chernoff bound because every input is good with probability µF .
Then every 2-collision in L2 has probability 0.999µF to be good. So by Chernoff bound, L2 contains
at least 0.9992µF t2 good 2-collisions with overwhelming probability. By induction, in the final list
Lk−1, with overwhelming probability, there are 0.999k−1µF · tk−1 good (k − 1)-collisions. Finally,
the algorithm outputs a k-collision with probability 1, by making at most O(
√
N/(0.99k−1µF tk−1))
quantum queries.
As long as k is a constant, the coefficients before ti are all constants. The number of quantum
queries is scaled by a constant and is still O(N (2
k−1−1)/(2k−1)) and the algorithm succeeds with
overwhelming probability.
4 Lower Bound for Multi-collision Finding
4.1 Idea in [Zha18]
We will first show how Zhandry re-proved the lower bound of 2-collision finding using compressed
oracle technique. The idea is that when we are working under compressed phase/standard oracle
model, a query made by the adversary (x, u) can be recorded in the compressed oracle database.
Suppose before making the next quantum query, the current joint state is the following
|φ〉 =
∑
x,u,z,D
ax,u,z,D|x, u, z〉 ⊗ |D〉
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where x is the query register, u is the response register, z is the private storage of the adversary
and D is the database in the compressed phase oracle model. Consider measuring D after running
the algorithm. Because the algorithm only has information about the points in the database D,
the only way to have a non-trivial probability of finding a collision is for the D that results from
measurement to have a collision. More formally, here is a lemma from [Zha18].
Lemma 7 (Lemma 5 from [Zha18]). Consider a quantum algorithm A making queries to a random
oracle H and outputting tuples (x1, · · · , xk, y1, · · · , yk, z). Let R be a collection of such tuples.
Suppose with probability p, A outputs a tuple such that (1) the tuple is in R and (2) H(xi) = yi for
all i. Now consider running A with compressed standard/phase oracle, and suppose the database D
is measured after A produces its output. Let p′ be the probability that (1) the tuple is in R, and (2)
D(xi) = yi for all i (and in particular D(xi) 6= ⊥). Then
√
p ≤
√
p′ +
√
k/2n
As long as k is small, the difference is negligible. So we can focus on bounding the probability
p′.
Let P˜1 be a projection spanned by all the states with z,D containing at least one collision in
the compressed phase oracles. In other words, z contains x 6= x′ such that D(x) 6= ⊥, D(x′) 6= ⊥
and D(x) = D(x′).
P˜1 =
∑
x,u,z
z,D: ≥ 1 collision
|x, u, z,D〉〈x, u, z,D|
We care about the amplitude (square root of the probability)
∣∣∣P˜1|φ〉∣∣∣. As in the above lemma,∣∣∣P˜1|φ〉∣∣∣ = √p′ and k = 2. Moreover, we can bound the amplitude of the following measurement.
P1 =
∑
x,u,z
D: ≥ 1 collision
|x, u, z,D〉〈x, u, z,D|
Here “D :≥ 1 collision” meaning D as a compressed phase oracle, it has a pair of x 6= x′ such
that D(x) = D(x′). It is easy to see |P1|φ〉| ≥ |P˜1|φ〉|. So we will focus on bounding |P1|φ〉| in the
rest of the paper.
For every |x, u, z,D〉, after making one quantum query, the size of D will increase by at most
1. Let |φi〉 be the state before making the (i + 1)-th quantum query and |φ′i〉 be the state after
it. Let O be the unitary over the joint system corresponding to an oracle query, in other words,
|φ′i〉 = O|φi〉. By making q queries, the computation looks like the following:
• At the beginning, it has |φ0〉;
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ q, it makes a quantum query; the state |φi−1〉 becomes |φ′i−1〉; and it applies a
unitary on its registers U i⊗ id to get |φi〉 where U i is some unitary defined over the registers
x, u, z.
• Finally measure it using P1, the probability of finding a collision (in the compressed phase
oracle) is at most |P1|φq〉|2
We have the following two lemmas:
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Lemma 8. For any unitary U i,
|P1|φ′i−1〉| = |P1 · (U i ⊗ id) · |φ′i−1〉| = |P1|φi〉|
Proof. Intuitively, P1 is a measurement on the oracle’s register and U
i is a unitary on the adversary’s
registers, applying the unitary does not affect the measurement P1.
Because U i is a unitary defined over the registers x, u, z and P1 is a projective measurement
defined over the database register D, we have
∣∣P1 · (U i ⊗ id) · |φ′i−1〉∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣P1 · (U i ⊗ id) ·
∑
x,u,z,D
αx,u,z,D|x, u, z,D〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣P1 · (U i ⊗ id) ·
∑
D
|ψD〉 ⊗ |D〉
∣∣∣∣∣
=
√ ∑
D ≥ 1 collision
|U i|ψD〉|2 =
√ ∑
D ≥ 1 collision
||ψD〉|2
which is the same as |P1|φ′i−1〉|.
Lemma 9. |P1|φ′i〉| ≤ |P1|φi〉|+
√
i√
N
.
Proof. We have
|P1|φ′i〉| = |P1O|φi〉|
= |P1O (P1|φi〉+ (I − P1)|φi〉)|
≤ |P1OP1|φi〉|+ |P1O(I − P1)|φi〉|
≤ |P1|φi〉|+ |P1O(I − P1)|φi〉|
|P1OP1|φi〉| ≤ |P1|φi〉| is because P1|φi〉 contains only D with collisions. By making one more
query, the total magnitude will not increase.
So we only need to bound the second term |P1O(I − P1)|φi〉|. (I − P1)|φ〉 contains only states
|x, u, z,D〉 that D has no collision. If after applying O to a state |x, u, z,D〉, the size of D does not
increase (stays the same or becomes smaller), the new database still does not contain any collision.
Otherwise, it becomes
∑
u′ ω
uu′
n |x, u, z,D⊕ (x, u′)〉. And only |D| ≤ i out of N possible D⊕ (x, u′)
contain a collision.
|P1O(I − P1)|φi〉| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣P1O
∑
x,u,z,D
D: no collision
ax,u,z,D|x, u, z,D〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣P1
∑
x,u,z,D
D: no collision
1√
N
∑
u′
ωuu
′
n ax,u,z,D|x, u, z,D ⊕ (x, u′)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤

 ∑
x,u,z,D
D: no collision
i
N
· a2x,u,z,D


1/2
≤
√
i√
N
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By combining lemma 8 and lemma 9, we have that |P1|φi〉| ≤
∑i−1
j=1
√
j√
N
= O(i3/2/N1/2). So we
re-prove the following theorem:
Theorem 10. For any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where |Y | = N ,
it needs to make Ω(N1/3) quantum queries to find a 2-collision with constant probability.
4.2 Intuition for generalizations
Here is the intuition for k = 3: as we have seen in the proof for k = 2, after T1 = O(N
1/3) quantum
queries, the database has high probability to contain a 2-collision. Following the same formula,
after making T2 queries, the amplitude that it contains two 2-collisions is about
T2∑
T1+1
√
i√
N
= O
(
T
3/2
2 − T 3/21√
N
)
⇒ T2 = O(22/3N1/3)
And similarly after Ti = O(i
2/3N1/3), the database will contain i 2-collisions. Now we just assume
between the (Ti−1 +1)-th query and Ti-th query, the database contains exactly (i− 1) 2-collisions.
Every time a quantum query is made to a database with i 2-collisions, with probability at
most i/N , the new database will contain a 3-collision. Similar to the lemma 9, when we make
queries until the database contains m 2-collisions, the amplitude that it contains a 3-collision in
the database is at most
m∑
i=1
√
i√
N
(Ti − Ti−1) ≈
∫ m
1
x1/6
N1/6
dx ≈ x7/6/N1/6
which gives us that the number of 2-collisions is m = N1/7. And the total number of quantum
queries is Tm = m
2/3 ·N1/3 = N3/7 which is what we expected.
In the following sections, we will show how to bound the probability/amplitude of finding a
k = 2, 3, 4-collision and any constant k-collision with constant probability. All the proof ideas are
explained step by step through the proof for k = 2, 3, 4. The proof for any constant k is identical
to the proof for k = 4 but every parameter is replaced with functions of k.
4.3 Lower Bound for 2-collisions
Let P2,j be a projection spanned by all the states with D containing at least j distinct 2-collisions
in the compressed phase oracle model.
P2,j =
∑
x,u,z
D: ≥ j 2-collisions
|x, u, z,D〉〈x, u, z,D|
Let the current joint state be |φ〉 (after making i quantum queries but before the (i + 1)-th
query), and |φ′〉 be the state after making the (i+ 1)-th quantum query.
|φ〉 =
∑
x,u,z,D
ax,u,z,D|x, u〉 ⊗ |z,D〉
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We have the relation following from lemma 9:
|P2,1|φ′〉| ≤ |P2,1|φ〉|+
√
i√
N
|P2,j |φ′〉| ≤ |P2,j |φ〉|+
√
i√
N
|P2,j−1|φ′〉| for all j > 0
Let |φ0〉, |φ1〉, · · · , |φi〉 be the state after making 0, 1, · · · , i quantum queries respectively. Let
fi,j = |P2,j |φi〉|. We rewrite the relations using fi,j:
fi,1 ≤ fi−1,1 +
√
i− 1√
N
=
∑
0≤l<i
√
l√
N
<
i3/2√
N
fi,j ≤ fi−1,j +
√
i− 1
N
fi−1,j−1
=
∑
0≤l1<i
√
l1√
N
fl1,j−1
=
∑
0≤l2<l1<i
√
l1√
N
√
l2√
N
fl2,j−2
=
∑
0≤lj<lj−1<···<l2<l1<i
j∏
k=1
(√
lk√
N
)
<
1
j!
∑
0≤lj ,lj−1,··· ,l2,l1<i
j∏
k=1
(√
lk√
N
)
=
1
j!
(fi,1)
j
<
(
e · i3/2
j
√
N
)j
We observe that when i = o(j2/3N1/3), fi,j = o(1).
Corollary 11. For any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where |Y | = N ,
by making i queries, the probability of finding constant j 2-collisions is at most O
(
( i
3
N )
j
)
.
Theorem 12. For any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where |Y | = N ,
it needs to make Ω(j2/3N1/3) quantum queries to find j 2-collisions with constant probability.
4.4 Lower Bound for 3-collisions
Let P3,k be a projection spanned by all the states with D containing at least k distinct 3-collisions
in the compressed phase model. And let P3,j,k be a projection spanned by all the states with D
containing exactly j distinct 2-collisions and at least k 3-collisions.
Let the current joint state be |φ〉 (after making i quantum queries but before the (i + 1)-th
query), and |φ′〉 be the state after making the (i + 1)-th quantum query. We have the following
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relation similar to Lemma 9:
|P3,k|φ′〉| ≤ |P3,k|φ〉|+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P3,k
∑
l≥0
∑
x,u,z
D: exactly l 2-collisions
exactly k − 1 3-collision
1√
N
∑
u′
ωuu
′
n · αx,u,z,D|x, u, z,D ⊕ (x, u′)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where the first term means D already contains at least k 3-collisions before the query; and the
second term is the case where a new 3-collision is added into the database. Similar to Lemma 9,
only l out of N u′ will make D ⊕ (x, u′) contain k 3-collisions. So we have,
|P3,k|φ′〉| ≤ |P3,k|φ〉|+
√√√√√√
∑
l≥0
l
N
∑
x,u,z
D: exactly l 2-collisions
exactly k − 1 3-collision
|α|2x,u,z,D
≤ |P3,k|φ〉|+
√√√√∑
l≥0
l
N
|P3,l,k−1|φ〉|2
Let gi,k be the amplitude |P3,k|φi〉| and gi,j,k = |P3,j,k|φi〉|. It is easy to see gi,0 ≤ 1 for any
i ≥ 0 since it is an amplitude. We have the following:
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√√√√∑
l≥0
l
N
· g2i−1,l,k−1
Let fi,j = |P2,j |φi〉|. Define h3(i) = max{2e · i3/2√N , 10N
1/8}. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 13.
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√
h3(i− 1)
N
gi−1,k−1 + fi−1,h3(i−1)
Proof.
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√√√√∑
l≥0
l
N
· g2i−1,l,k−1
≤ gi−1,k +
√√√√ ∑
0≤l≤h3(i−1)
l
N
· g2i−1,l,k−1 +
√ ∑
l>h3(i−1)
1 · g2i−1,l,k−1
≤ gi−1,k +
√
h3(i− 1)
N
·
√∑
l≥0
g2i−1,l,k−1 +
√ ∑
l>h3(i−1)
g2i−1,l,k−1
≤ gi−1,k +
√
h3(i− 1)
N
· gi−1,k−1 + fi−1,h3(i−1)
Here, in the last line, we used the fact that
∑
l≥0 g
2
i−1,l,k−1 represents the total probability of the
database having k − 1 distinct 3-collisions, and so is equal to g2i−1,k−1. Similarly, we used that
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∑
l>h3(i−1) g
2
i−1,l,k−1 represents the total probability of having at least k−1 distinct 3-collisions and
at least h3(i− 1) distinct 2-collisions. This probability is bounded above by the probability of just
having at least h3(i− 1) distinct 2-collisions, which is f2i−1,h3(i−1).
Lemma 14. Define Ai =
∑i−1
l=0
√
h3(l)
N . Then gi,k can be bounded as the following:
gi,k ≤ A
k
i
k!
+ 2−N
1/8
for all i ≤ N1/2, 1 ≤ k ≤ N1/8
Proof. If we expand Lemma 13, we have
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√
h3(i− 1)
N
gi−1,k−1 + fi−1,h3(i−1)
≤ gi−2,k +
i−1∑
l=i−2
(√
h3(l)
N
gl,k−1 + fl,h3(l)
)
...
≤ g0,k +
i−1∑
l=0
(√
h3(l)
N
gl,k−1 + fl,h3(l)
)
where if k ≥ 1, g0,k = 0. Next,
gi,k ≤
∑
0≤l<i
√
h3(l)
N
gl,k−1 +
∑
0≤l<i
fl,h3(l)
≤
∑
0≤l<i
√
h3(l)
N
gl,k−1 +N1/2
(
1
2
)10N1/8
≤
∑
0≤l<i
√
h3(l)
N
gl,k−1 + 2−9.5N
1/8
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By recursively expanding the inequality, we will get
gi,k ≤
∑
0≤l1<i
√
h3(l1)
N
gl1,k−1 + 2
−9.5N1/8
≤
∑
0≤l1<i
√
h3(l1)
N

 ∑
0≤l2<l1
√
h3(l2)
N
gl2,k−2 + 2
−9.5N1/8

+ 2−9.5N1/8
≤
∑
0≤l1<i
√
h3(l1)
N

 ∑
0≤l2<l1
√
h3(l2)
N

 ∑
0≤l3<l2
√
h3(l3)
N
· · ·

+ 2−9.5N1/8

+ 2−9.5N1/8
=
∑
0≤lk<lk−1<···<l1<i
k∏
j=1
(√
h3(lj)
N
)
+ 2−9.5N
1/8
k−1∑
t=0
∑
0≤lt<lk−1<···<l1<i
t∏
j=1
(√
h3(lj)
N
)
<
Aki
k!
+
k−1∑
t=0
Ati
t!
· 2−9.5N1/8
<
Aki
k!
+ eAi · 2−9.5N1/8
We then bound Ai for all i ≤ N1/2 (we can always assume i = o(N1/2), because finding any
constant-collision using O(N1/2) quantum queries is easy by a quantum computer, just repeatedly
applying Grover’s algorithm):
Ai ≤
i∑
l=1
√
2e · l3/2
N3/4
+
∑
l:h3(l)=10N1/8
√
10N1/8
N1/2
≤
√
2e · i
7/4
N3/4
+O
(
N−1/48
)
Which implies Ai < 2e ·N1/8 (by letting i =
√
N). So we complete the proof:
gi,k ≤ A
k
i
k!
+ eAi · 2−9.5N1/8
≤ A
k
i
k!
+ e2e·N
1/8 · 2−9.5N1/8
<
Aki
k!
+ 2−N
1/8
Theorem 15. For any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where |Y | = N , it
needs to make Ω(j4/7N3/7) quantum queries to find j 3-collisions for any j ≤ N1/8 with constant
probability.
Proof. We have two cases:
• When j is a constant: If i∗ = o(N3/7), we have gi∗,j ≤ o(1) +O(N−1/48).
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• When j is not a constant: For any j, let i∗ be the largest integer such that Ai∗ < 12e · j. In
this case, i∗ = O
(
j4/7N3/7
)
. So the probability of having at least j 3-collisions is bounded
by g2i∗,j where gi∗,j ≤ (eAi∗/j)j + 2−N
1/8 ≤ 2−j+1 + 2−N1/8 = o(1).
4.5 Lower Bound for 4-collisions
Here we show the proof for lower bound of finding 4-collisions. The proof for arbitrary constant
has the same structure but different parameters which is shown in the next section. We prove the
case of 4-collisions here to give the idea before generalizing.
Let fi,j be the amplitude of the database containing at least j 3-collisions after making i
quantum queries, gi,j,k be the amplitude of the database containing exactly j 3-collisions and at
least k 4-collisions after i quantum queries, gi,k be the amplitude of containing at least k 4-collisions
after i quantum queries.
As we have seen in the last proof, we have
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√√√√∑
l≥0
l
N
g2i−1,l,k−1
Define h4(i) = max{(2e)3/2 · i7/4N3/4 , 10N1/16}. Again, we can bound gi,k by dividing the summa-
tion into two parts:
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√√√√ ∑
l≤h4(i−1)
l
N
g2i−1,l,k−1 +
√ ∑
l>h4(i−1)
1 · g2i−1,l,k−1
≤ gi−1,k +
√
h4(i− 1)
N
gi−1,k−1 + fi−1,h4(i−1)
...
≤
∑
0≤l<i
√
h4(l)
N
gl,k−1 +
∑
0≤l<i
fl,h4(l)
The second term can be bounded as the following (and we can safely assume i < N1/2)
∑
0≤l<i
fl,h4(l) ≤
∑
0≤l<i
(
A
h4(l)
l
h4(l)!
+ 2−N
1/8
)
≤
∑
0≤l<i
(
eAl
h4(l)
)h4(l)
+N1/2 · 2−N1/8
≤
∑
0≤l<i
(
1
2
+ o(1)
)10N1/16
+N1/2 · 2−N1/8
≤ 2−9.5N1/16
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Let Bi =
∑
0≤l<i
√
h4(l)
N . And similarly, for all i ≤ N1/2,
Bi ≤ (2e)3/4 i
15/8
N7/8
+O(N−
1
16
· 1
14 )
The proof follows from the last proof for k = 3. A generalized version (for any constant) can be
found in the next section. And Bi is bounded by B√N which is at most 2e ·N1/16.
Finally we have the following closed form:
gi,k ≤ B
k
i
k!
+
k−1∑
l=0
Bli
l!
· 2−9.5N1/16 < B
k
i
k!
+ eB
√
N · 2−9.5N1/16 ≤ B
k
i
k!
+ 2−N
1/16
So we can conclude the following theorem:
Theorem 16. For any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where N = |Y |, it
needs to make Ω(j8/15N7/15) quantum queries to find j 4-collisions for any j ≤ N1/16 with constant
probability.
4.6 Lower bound for finding a constant-collision
In this section, we are going to show that the theorem can be generalized to any constant-collision.
Let fi,j be the amplitude of the database containing at least j distinct s-collisions after i quantum
queries, gi,j,k be the amplitude of the database containing exactly j distinct s-collisions and at least
k distinct (s+ 1)-collisions after i quantum queries. Also let gi,k be the amplitude of the database
with at least k distinct (s+ 1)-collisions after i quantum queries.
We assume fi,j is only defined for i ≤
√
N, 1 ≤ j ≤ N1/2s and gi,k is only defined for i ≤√
N, 1 ≤ k ≤ N1/2s+1 . It holds for the base cases s = 4.
Define hs(i) (for any s ≥ 3) as the following:
hs(i) = max
{
(2e)
2s−2−1
2s−3
i(2
s−1−1)/2s−2
N (2
s−2−1)/2s−2 , 10 ·N
1/2s
}
It holds for s = 3, 4 where h3(i) = max{(2e) · i3/2/N1/2, 10N1/8} and h4(i) = max{(2e)3/2 ·
i7/4/N3/4, 10N1/16}.
Define Ai,s =
∑i−1
l=0
√
hs(l)
N . And Ai,s ≤ (2e)
2s−2−1
2s−2 i
(2s−1)/2s−1
N(2
s−1−1)/2s−1 + O(N
−1/(2s(2s−2))). It is easy
to see Ai and Bi in the last proof are Ai,3 and Ai,4.
Lemma 17. Ai,s ≤ (2e)
2s−2−1
2s−2 i
(2s−1)/2s−1
N(2
s−1−1)/2s−1 +O(N
−1/(2s(2s−2))) holds for all constant s ≥ 3.
The lemma is consistent with the cases where s = 3, 4.
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Proof.
Ai,s =
i−1∑
l=0
√
hs(l)
N
=
∑
l:hs(l)=10N1/2
s
√
10N1/2s
N
+
∑
l:hs(l)>10N1/2
s
√
hs(l)
N
=
∑
l:hs(l)=10N1/2
s
√
10N1/2s
N
+
i−1∑
l=0
(2e)
2s−2−1
2s−2
l(2
s−1−1)/2s−1
N (2
s−2−1)/2s−1 ·N
−1/2
where the second summation is at most (2e)
2s−2−1
2s−2 i
(2s−1)/2s−1
N(2
s−1−1)/2s−1 and the first summation is at most
∑
l:hs(l)=10N1/2
s
√
10N1/2
s
N
=
√
10N1/2
s
N
·O
(
N
(
1
2s
+1− 1
2s−2
)
· 2s−2
2s−1−1
)
≤ O
(
N−
1
2
+ 1
2s+1 ·N
2s−3
4(2s−1−1)
)
≤ O
(
N
− 1
2s(2s−2)
)
which completes the proof.
Finally, we assume fi,j ≤ A
j
i,s
j! +O(2
−N1/2s ) which holds for both s = 3, 4. We are going to show
it holds for (s+ 1), in other words, gi,k ≤ A
k
i,s+1
k! +O(2
−N1/2s+1 ). And by induction, it holds for all
constant s.
As we have seen in the last proof, we have the following inequality:
gi,k ≤ gi−1,k +
√√√√∑
l≥0
l
N
g2i−1,l,k−1
≤ gi−1,k +
√
hs+1(i− 1)
N
· gi−1,k−1 + fi−1,hs+1(i−1)
where as i ≤ N1/2, for sufficient large N , the last term fi−1,hs+1(i−1) can be bounded as:
fi−1,hs+1(i−1) ≤
A
hs+1(i−1)
i−1,s
hs+1(i− 1)! +O(2
−N1/2s )
≤

e · (2e)
2s−2−1
2s−2 (i−1)
(2s−1)/2s−1
N(2
s−1−1)/2s−1 +O(N
−1/(2s(2s−2)))
max
{
(2e)
2s−1−1
2s−2 (i−1)(2
s−1)/2s−1
N(2
s−1−1)/2s−1 , 10 ·N1/2s+1
}


10N1/2
s+1
+O(2−N
1/2s
)
≤
(
1
2
+ o(1)
)10N1/2s+1
+O(2−N
1/2s
)
< 2−9.8N
1/2s+1
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By expanding the inequality, we get
gi,k ≤
i−1∑
l=0
√
hs+1(l)
N
gl,k−1 +N1/2 · 2−9.8N1/2
s+1
≤
i−1∑
l=0
√
hs+1(l)
N
gl,k−1 + 2−9.5N
1/2s+1
≤ A
k
i,s+1
k!
+
k−1∑
l=0
Ali,s+1
l!
· 2−9.5N1/2
s+1
≤ A
k
i,s+1
k!
+ eAi,s+1 · 2−9.5N1/2
s+1
Because i ≤ √N , Ai,s+1 < 2eN1/2s+1 . Finally, we have
gi,k ≤
Aki,s+1
k!
+ 2−N
1/2s+1
which completes the induction. So we have the following theorem:
Corollary 18. For any constant s ≥ 2, let fi,j be the amplitude of the database containing at least
j s-collisions after i quantum queries. For all 1 ≤ j ≤ N1/2s , we have
fi,j ≤
Aji,s
j!
+O(2−N
1/2s
)
where
Ai,s ≤ (2e)
2s−2−1
2s−2
i(2
s−1)/2s−1
N (2s−1−1)/2s−1
+O(N−1/(2
s(2s−2)))
Theorem 19. For any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where N = |Y |,
it needs to make Ω(j2
s−1/(2s−1)N (2s−1−1)/(2s−1)) quantum queries to find j s-collisions for any j ≤
N1/2
s
.
Moreover, for any quantum algorithm, given a random function f : X → Y where N = |Y |, it
needs to make Ω(N (2
s−1−1)/(2s−1)) quantum queries to find one s-collision.
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